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Abstract 
 
The insurance sector plays a critical role in any economy by its very mechanism of risk transfer and 
savings mobilisation. It thus performs a critical role in intermediation by fostering the liquidity of the 
financial markets.  This in turn ensures that capital is transferred from surplus units to deficient units 
of the economy who are in need of funds for the undertaking of capital projects and thereby spurring 
productivity. In the aftermath of the 2007 to 2009 financial crisis the insurance industry image was 
tainted. As such, the observance of good corporate governance tenets has now more than ever before 
become quintessential and also a prescription by regulators. The purpose of this paper is to explore the 
corporate governance practices (both internal control as well as regulatory measures) that are 
prevalent in the South African Insurance industry. This paper utilised qualitative research methods 
and lend itself to document analysis of company reports that the insurance companies submit, as well 
as the Acts and industry codes that governs the insurance industry in South Africa. The Atlas.ti 
software was used to analyse the documents. We find evidence that insurers are at various stages of 
embedding good corporate governance practices. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the insurance 
companies by and large have strengthened their internal control systems. They have also complied 
with regulatory directives and are grappling with the implementation of Treating Customers Fairly 
(TCF) as well as Solvency Assessment Measurement (SAM) which are market conduct and prudential 
regulations respectively. Further they also subscribe to the King I, King II and King III frameworks of 
corporate governance. However we wish to caution against “over regulating” this sector as this could 
stifle innovation. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Embedding good corporate governance practices 
continues to be a preoccupation of regulators and 
those vested with the fiduciary role of safeguarding 
shareholders’ interests alike. There is an impelling 
need to investigate how this process has unravelled in 
the insurance sector. The motivation in selecting the 
insurance sector is that it plays a critical role in any 
economy by virtue of its ability to mobilise savings as 
well as to operate as an agent of risk transfer. The 
2007-2009 global financial crises brought to the fore 
the importance of financial sector stability to the 
general wellbeing of economies.  Attendant to 
securing the financial sector would be to ingrain good 
corporate governance practices either by way of 
internal controls or by strengthening existing 
regulation. 
The 2007-2009 global financial crises have been 
partly explicable as a result of poor corporate 
governance practices. The failure of banks and 
insurance companies in the developed world came at a 
huge cost (Brunnermeier, 2009). It is instructive to 
highlight that the world economy receded. Similarly 
South Africa entered a period of recession in 2009 
with the Gross Domestic Product contracting by minus 
1,8 per cent. The financial sector in South Africa 
comprises over R6 trillion in assets, contributes 10,5 
per cent of the Gross Domestic Product per year, 
employing 3,9% of the employed and contributes at 
least 15 per cent of corporate income tax (National 
Treasury, 2011). Although South Africa has sound 
macroeconomic fundamentals and a robust financial 
regulatory framework it suffered more proportionately 
as compared to other G-20 countries. It is estimated 
that close to 1 million jobs were lost during the same 
period (National Treasury, 2011). 
The impetus behind this study is to establish the 
adequacy of the corporate governance practices of the 
South African insurance industry. The present study 
aims to contribute to the corporate governance 
literature by specifically focusing on the insurance 
sector in the context of South Africa. Hitherto the 
studies that have been conducted have largely focused 
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on the moral hazard effect of Directors’ and Officers’ 
(DO) insurance coverage (See for example, Baker and 
Griffith, 2007; Core, 2000; O’Sullivan, 1997). It could 
be argued that South Africa presents itself as the best 
case study as it has a very diverse culture, its financial 
system has improved vastly over the years and 
attendant to this the regulatory environment has also 
evolved over the years (Sibindi, 2014 ; Sibindi and 
Godi, 2014). 
In this article we shall carry out a two pronged 
approach to investigate the adequacy of the corporate 
governance practices embraced by the South African 
insurance industry. Firstly we shall focus on internal 
control governance practices that are employed by the 
insurance sector as envisaged in the King III report. 
The second prong will be to appraise of the external 
corporate governance measure in essence which is the 
insurance regulatory landscape. To this end there has 
been a raft of regulatory reforms that have been 
promulgated. In the aftermath of the 2007-2009 
financial crises the regulatory response was to institute 
the so called “twin peaks” regulation. These peaks are 
financial stability or prudential regulations and the 
market conduct regulations. A raft of reforms has been 
implemented and include amongst others, the 
Solvency Assessment Management (SAM) regime 
whose main aim is to improve the capital and solvency 
levels of insurance companies. The second categories 
of regulations that have been implemented are targeted 
at market conduct and include amongst others the 
Treating Customers Fairly (TCF) regulations which 
are aimed at protecting the insurance consumers. We 
thus also hope to chat the way forward for policy 
makers in South Africa as they grapple with policies 
that are aimed at securing the financial sector, 
specifically targeted at the insurance sector. 
The remainder of paper is arranged as follows: 
the next section provides an overview of the insurance 
sector in South Africa. Section 3 reviews the related 
literature. Section 4 reviews the insurance regulatory 
framework. Section 5 discusses the internal corporate 
governance measures adopted by the South African 
insurance industry and then Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 An overview of the insurance sector in 
South Africa 
 
The insurance sector in South Africa comprises of 79 
long-term insurers and 7 long-term reinsurers, 100 
short-term insurance companies and 8 short-term 
reinsurance companies (FSB, 2012). In South Africa 
the insurance companies that transact life insurance 
business are referred to as long-term insurers. 
Similarly the companies that transact non-life 
(property) insurance are referred to as short-term 
insurers. 
The key metrics of the insurance companies for 
the period 2011 to 2013 are given in Tables 1 and 2 
below. The gross premiums of long-term insurance 
companies show a remarkable growth of 43% from 
about R301 billion registered in 2011 to roughly R430 
billion registered in 2013. On the other hand the 
premiums of short-term insurance companies show 
steady growth of 19% from about R81 billion 
registered in 2011 to the levels of about R96 billion 
registered in 2013. A similar trend is observed when 
evaluating the total assets with the long-term 
insurance industry registering a phenomenon growth 
in total assets of 32% from roughly R1, 7 trillion in 
2011 to R2, 3 trillion in 2013 as compared to the 
short-term insurance industry which shows steady 
growth of about 23% from roughly R90 billion in 
2011 to R112 billion in 2013. 
The information provided in Table 2 depicts the 
investment vehicles of the insurance companies. Thus 
it would seem that the insurance companies both long 
and short-term play a critical role in intermediation, 
savings and resource mobilisation. 
 
Table 1. Gross premiums and total assets of insurance companies in South Africa 
 
 2011 2012 2013 
Long-Term 
Insurers 
Short-Term 
Insurers 
Long-Term 
Insurers 
Short-Term 
Insurers 
Long-Term 
Insurers 
Short-Term 
Insurers 
Gross 
Premiums  
/ R’mil 
300 650 80 951 358 967 87 675 429 703 96 178 
Total Assets 
 / R’mil 
1 722 777 90 472 2 000 555 101 547 2 278 148 111 686 
Source: authors’ own compilation, data from FSB (2013) 
 
3 Review of related literature 
 
The most apt definition of corporate governance was 
perhaps by given by Shleifer and Vishny (1997). They 
observe that corporate governance deals with the ways 
in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure 
themselves of getting a return on their investment. 
How do the suppliers of finance get managers to 
return some of the profits to them? How do they make 
sure that managers do not steal the capital they supply 
or invest it in bad projects? How do suppliers of 
finance control managers? Corporate governance 
influences the efficiency of firm production at the 
corporate level, so that the effectiveness of a nation’s 
corporate governance system shapes economic 
performance at a country level. Standard agency 
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theory defines the corporate governance problem in 
terms how equity and debt holders influence managers 
to act in the best interests of the providers of capital. 
To the extent that shareholders and creditors induce 
managers to maximize firm value, this will improve 
the efficiency with which firms allocate resources 
(Caprio and Levine, 2002). In essence these 
definitions of corporate governance encapsulate the 
agency problem. 
 
Table 2. The investments composition of insurance companies in South Africa 
 
 2011 2012 2013 
Long-Term 
Insurers 
Short-
Term 
Insurers 
Long-Term 
Insurers 
Short-
Term 
Insurers 
Long-Term 
Insurers 
Short-
Term 
Insurers 
Cash and deposits 
/ R’mil 
205 790 37 634 221 377 41 780 193 901 42 224 
Government and 
semi-government 
/ R’mil 
191 549 6 963 173 874 9 597 178 194 11 888 
Equities  
/R’mil 
862 648 25 813 1 221 629 28 605 1 470 533 29 946 
Debentures and 
loan stock 
/ R’mil 
128 379 1 666 176 585 1833 215 743 1903 
Immovable 
Property 
/ R’mil 
58 833 - 58 152 - 49 571 - 
Fixed Assets 
/ R’mil 
181 838 1 004 2 112 842 2 367 1 091 
Debtors 
/ R’mil 
94 965 7 265 118 589 7 980 133 930 9 027 
Outstanding 
Premiums 
/ R’mil 
- 5 815 - 7 016 - 8 375 
Other Assets 
/ R’mil 
0 4 311 28 235 3 893 33 909 7 231 
Total Assets 
 / R’mil 
1 724 002 90 472 2 000 555 101 547 2 278 148 111 686 
Source: authors’ own compilation, data from FSB (2013) 
 
Davis (2002) buttresses the agency viewpoint 
further and observes that, given the divorce of 
ownership and control in corporations, principal-agent 
problems arise, as shareholders cannot perfectly 
control managers acting on their behalf. Managers 
have superior information about the firm and its 
prospects, and at most a partial link of their 
compensation to the firms’ profitability. This gives 
them incentives to divert funds in various ways away 
from those who sink equity capital in the firm. Lower 
profitability and dividends, poor investment allocation 
and low productivity may be the result of failure to 
address these “corporate governance” problems. 
Institutional investors, because of their greater 
bargaining power over the firm relative to individuals, 
are well placed to minimise these problems. 
Classens and Yurtoglu (2013) aver that the 
objective of a good corporate governance framework 
would be to maximize the contribution of firms to the 
overall economy—that is, including all stakeholders. 
Under this definition, corporate governance would 
include the relationship between shareholders, 
creditors, and corporations; between financial markets, 
institutions, and corporations; and between employees 
and corporations. Corporate governance would also 
encompass the issue of corporate social responsibility, 
including such aspects as the dealings of the firm with 
respect to culture and the environment. 
Zalewaska (2014) contends that there has been a 
dramatic change in corporate governance practices 
over the past two decades as a result of the 
proliferation of the big corporate scandals since 1980.  
She goes on to observe that the agency problem has 
been exacerbated. Asymmetric information is at the 
heart of agency problems and is commonly thought to 
lie behind the market failures and the associated 
corporate scandals. But is asymmetric information 
more of an issue in the modern business environment 
than before? There are reasons to think that this may 
be so. First, the emergence of large scale businesses 
with complex organisational forms may have 
significantly increased opaqueness within 
corporations, resulting in greater informational 
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asymmetry between investors and management. 
Second, paradoxically, the asymmetry may have also 
increased as a result of informational technological 
progress. This is because, while on one hand, more 
information is now available, it may also cause 
information overload, hence, it may be more, rather 
than less difficult to extract information that is 
relevant and important. Third, it also seems that 
longer-run changes in ownership structure may have 
contributed to this change. The unprecedented growth 
of stock markets with the associated spread of 
ownership is thought to have decreased the ability of 
shareholders to monitor management. It also seems 
that the transformation of ownership from individual 
shareholders to institutional investors has not 
mitigated this problem (Zalewska, 2014). 
Corporate governance practices have evolved 
over the years in South Africa. According to  Ntim, 
Lindop and Thomas (2013) formal attempts at 
enhancing corporate governance practices in SA 
corporations began in 1994 with the King I report, but 
whilst the proposals were observably similar to those 
of other Anglo-American countries, the report 
distinctively focused on both financial (shareholder) 
and non-financial (stakeholder) aspects, particularly 
regarding the environment, health, safety and 
affirmative action. They go on to observe that, 
however, and crucially, King I failed to explicitly 
make recommendations relating to sound corporate 
risk management and reporting practices (King 
Committee, 1994, 2002). Consequently, King I was 
revised and replaced with a second King Report (King 
II) in 2002. Similar to King I, King II focused on 
governing the firm in the broader interests of both 
shareholders and stakeholders, but distinct from King 
I, it placed special emphasis on the need for sound and 
robust risk management and reporting practices (King 
Committee, 2002). Specifically, it provided explicit 
guidance in three main areas of risk management: 
definition, identification, and classification of risks; 
risk governance structure; and application and risk 
reporting. The promulgation of the new Companies 
Act in 2008 and changes in international corporate 
governance trends necessitated the revision of the 
code and hence the birth of King III in 2009. 
 King III extended the scope of reporting of 
companies to also cover: 
 how a company has, both positively and 
negatively, impacted on the economic life of the 
community in which it operated during the year under 
review; and 
 how the company intends to enhance those 
positive aspects and eradicate or ameliorate the 
negative aspects in the year ahead. 
 
4 The regulatory framework of the South 
African insurance sector   
 
The South African insurance sector (both long-term 
and short-term) is regulated by the Financial Services 
Board (FSB). Principally the Short Term Insurance 
Act of 1998 (STIA), the Long-Term Insurance Act of 
1998 (LTIA) the Insurance Laws Amendment Act of 
2008 and the Companies Act of 2008 govern the 
transaction of insurance business in South Africa. 
The thrust in insurance regulation has been to 
enhance the solvency margins of insurance companies 
through prudential (financial soundness) regulations 
and to foster market conduct. A raft of reforms has 
been implemented and include amongst others, the 
Solvency Assessment Management (SAM) regime 
whose main aim is to improve the capital and solvency 
levels of insurance companies. This is risk based 
solvency assessment management that comes into 
operation in 2016.  
Market conduct regulation is geared towards 
policyholder protection. Under this category, Treating 
Customers Fairly (TCF) regulations have been 
enacted. These are similar to those developed in the 
UK. Further the Financial Advisory and Intermediary 
Services (FAIS) Act promulgated in 2002 makes it 
mandatory for any person providing financial advice 
to have passed the regulatory examination and hence 
deemed “Fit and Proper” to proffer financial advice. 
The Registrar of Short-Term and Long-Term 
insurance in South Africa has developed guidelines on 
governance and risk management for insurers which 
take effect from April 2015. These guidelines largely 
encapsulate the provisions of the King III code. 
 
5 Internal corporate governance measures  
 
As a yardstick to measure internal corporate 
governance practices we make use of the King III 
checklist and test the conformance of the insurance 
sector to this code. This code consists of nine broad 
areas with guidance given for each area.  
These are: 
(1) Ethical leadership and corporate citizenship 
(2) Boards and directors  
(3) Audit committees  
(4) Governance of risk  
(5) The governance of information technology  
(6) Compliance with laws, rules, codes and 
standards 
(7)  Internal audit  
(8) Governance stakeholders relationship  
(9) Integrated reporting and disclosure. 
Our sample consists of 9 insurance companies, 
three transacting short-term (non-life) insurance, three 
transacting long-term (life) insurance and the 
remainder being three composite (both non-life and 
life) insurance companies. These are as follows, (1) 
Short-term; Santam, Zurich and Renasa, (2) Long-
Term; Sanlam, Lombard and Assupol, (3) 
Composites; Old Mutual, Clientele and RMI. We 
make use of Integrated Company Reports for 2013. 
The results are presented in the checklist below (Table 
3). 
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Table 3. Results from the King III Checklist 
 
King III 
Reference 
Principle 
Name of Company 
Short-term Insurance Long-term Insurance Composites 
Santam Zurich Renasa Sanlam Lombard Assupol 
Old 
Mutual 
Clientele 
Rand 
Merchant 
Insurance 
CHAPTER 1. ETHICAL LEADERSHIP AND CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP 
 1.1  The board should provide effective leadership based on an 
ethical foundation 
A A A A A A A A A 
 1.2 The board should ensure that the company is and is seen to be a 
responsible corporate citizen 
A A A A A A A A A 
CHAPTER 2.  BOARDS AND DIRECTORS 
 2.1 The board should act as the focal point for and the custodian of 
corporate governance 
A A A A A A A A A 
 2.2 The board should appreciate that strategy, risk, performance and 
sustainability are inseparable 
A A A A A A A A A 
2.14 The board and its directors should act in the best interest of the 
company 
A A A A A A A A A 
2.15 
 
The board should consider business rescue proceedings or other 
turnaround mechanism as soon as the company is financially 
distressed as defined in the Act. 
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
 2.16 The board should elect a chairman of the board who is an 
independent non-executive director. The CEO of the company 
should not also fulfil the role of the chairman of the board. 
A A A A A A A A NA 
2.17 The board should appoint the Chief executive officer and 
establish a framework for the delegation of authority. 
A A A A A A A A A 
2.18 The board should compromise a balance of power, with a 
majority of non-executive directors. The majority of non-
executive directors should be independent. 
A A A A A A A A PA 
2.19 Directors should be appointed through a formal process. A A A A A A A A A 
2.20 The induction of an on-going training and development of 
directors should be conducted through formal processes. 
A A A A A A A A A 
2.21 The board should be assisted by a competent, suitably qualified 
and experienced company secretary. 
A A A A A A A A A 
2.22 The evaluation of the board, it committees and the individual 
directors should be performed every year. 
A A A A A A A A A 
2.26 Companies should disclose the remuneration of each individual 
director and certain senior executives 
A PA A A A A A A PA 
2.27  Shareholders should approve the company’s remuneration policy A A A A A A A A A 
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Table 3. Results from the King III Checklist (continued) 
 
King III 
Reference 
Principle 
Name of Company 
Short-term Insurance Long-term Insurance Composites 
Santam Zurich Renasa Sanlam Lombard Assupol 
Old 
Mutual 
Clientele 
Rand Merchant 
Insurance 
CHAPTER 3. AUDIT COMMITTEES 
3.1 The board should ensure that the company has an effective and 
independent audit committee 
A A A A A A A A A 
3.2 Audit committee members should be suitably skilled and 
experienced independent non-executive directors 
A A A A A A A A A 
3.3 The audit committee should be chaired by an independent non-
executive director. 
A A A A A A A A A 
3.4 The audit committee should oversee integrated reporting. A A A A A A A A A 
3.5 The audit committee should ensure that a combined assurance 
model is applied to provide a coordinated approach to all assurance 
activities. 
A A A A A A A A A 
3.6 The audit committee should satisfy itself of the expertise, resources 
and experience of the company’s finance function. 
A A A A A A A A A 
3.7 The audit committee should be responsible for overseeing of 
internal audit. 
A A A A A A A A A 
3.8 The audit committee should be an integral component of the risk 
management process 
A A A A A A A A A 
3.9 The audit committee is responsible for recommending the 
appointment of the external auditor and overseeing the external 
audit process. 
A A A A A A A A A 
3.10 The audit committee should report to the board and shareholders on 
how it has discharged its duties. 
A A A A A A A A A 
CHAPTER 4. GOVERNANCE OF RISK 
4.1 The board should be responsible for the governance of risk A A A A A A A A A 
4.2 The board should determine the level of risk tolerance A A A A A A A A A 
4.3 The risk committee or audit committee should assist the board in 
caring out its risk responsibilities 
A A A A A A A A A 
4.4 The board should delegate to management the responsibility to 
design, implement and monitor the risk management plan. 
A A A A A A A A A 
4.5 The board should ensure that risk assessment are performed on a 
continual basis 
A A A A A A A A A 
4.6 The board should ensure that frameworks and methodologies A A A A A A A A A 
4.8 The board should ensure continual risk monitoring by management A A A A A A A A A 
4.9 The board should receive assurance regarding the effectiveness of 
the risk management process 
A A A A A A A A A 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 12, Issue 2, Winter 2015, Continued – 4 
 
432 
Table 3. Results from the King III Checklist (continued) 
 
King III 
Reference 
Principle 
Name of Company 
Short-term Insurance Long-term Insurance Composites 
Santam Zurich Renasa Sanlam Lombard Assupol 
Old 
Mutual 
Clientele 
Rand Merchant 
Insurance 
4.10 The board should ensure that there are processes in place enabling 
complete, timely, relevant, accurate and accessible risk disclosure to 
stakeholders. 
A A A A A A A A A 
CHAPTER 5. THE GOVERNANCE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
5.1 The board should be responsible for information technology (IT) 
governance. 
A A A A A A A A A 
5.2 IT should be aligned with the performance and sustainability 
objectives of the company. 
A A A A A A A A A 
5.3 The board should delegate to management the responsibility for the 
implementation of an IT governance framework. 
A A A A A A A A A 
5.4 The  board  should monitor and evaluate significant IT investments 
and expenditure 
A A A A A A A A A 
5.5 IT should form an integral part of the company’s risk management. A A A A A A A A A 
5.6 The board should ensure that information assets are managed 
effectively. 
A A A A A A A A A 
5.7 A risk committee and audit committee should assist the board in 
carrying IT responsibility. 
A A A A A A A A A 
CHAPTER 6. COMPLIANCE WITH LAWS, RULES, CODES AND STANDARDS 
6.1 The board should ensure that the company complies with applicable 
laws and considers adherence to non-binding rules, codes and 
standards. 
A A A A A A A A A 
6.2 The board and each individual director should have a working 
understanding of the effects of the applicable laws, rules, codes and 
standards on the company and its business. 
A A A A A A A A A 
6.3 Applied risk should form an integral part of the company’s risk 
management process. 
A A A A A A A A A 
6.4 The board should delegate to management the implementation of an 
effective compliance framework and processes. 
A A A A A A A A A 
CHAPTER 7. INTERNAL AUDIT 
7.1 The board should ensure that there is an effective risk based internal 
audit. 
A A A A A A A A A 
7.2 Internal audit should follow a risk based approach to its plan. A A A A A A A A A 
7.3 Internal audit should provide a written assessment of the company’s 
system of internal controls and risk management 
A A A A A A A A A 
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Table 3. Results from the King III Checklist (continued) 
 
King III 
Reference 
Principle 
Name of Company 
Short-term Insurance Long-term Insurance Composites 
Santam Zurich Renasa Sanlam Lombard Assupol 
Old 
Mutual 
Clientele 
Rand Merchant 
Insurance 
7.4 The audit committee should be responsible for overseeing internal 
audit. 
A A A A A A A A A 
7.5 Internal audit should be strategically positioned to achieve its 
objectives. 
A A A A A A A A A 
CHAPTER 8. GOVERNANCE STAKEHOLDERS RELATIONSHIP 
8.1 The board should appreciate that stakeholders’ perceptions affect a 
company’s reputation. 
A A A A A A A A A 
8.2 The board should delegate to management to proactively deal with 
stakeholders relationships. 
A A A A A A A A A 
8.3 The board should strive to achieve the appropriate balance between its 
various stakeholder groupings, in the best interests of the company. 
A A A A A A A A A 
8.4 Companies should ensure the equitable treatment of shareholders A A A A A A A A A 
8.5 Transparent and effective communication with stakeholders is 
essential for building and maintaining their trust and confidence. 
A A A A A A A A A 
8.6 The board should ensure that disputes are resolved as effectively, 
efficiently and expeditious as possible 
A A A A A A A A A 
CHAPTER 9. INTEGRATED REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE 
9.1 The board should ensure the integrity of the company’s integrated 
report. 
A A A A A A A A A 
9.2 Sustainability reporting and disclosure should be integrated with the 
company’s financial reporting. 
A A A A A A A A A 
9.3 Sustainability reporting and disclosure should be independently 
assured. 
A A A A A A A A A 
A = Applied, PA=Partially Applied and NA=Not Applied 
Source: Authors compilation (various company reports, 2013) 
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The premise of disclosure under King III is that, 
the company must comply and if it fails to comply 
with the code disclose why this has been the case. The 
results of the checklist show that the by and large 
insurance companies in South Africa are complying 
with the King III code of corporate governance.  The 
sample under survey has not applied principle 2.15 
which relates to turnaround strategies should the 
company be under distress, suffice to say that none of 
them have encountered financial distress.  
The other component that the two companies in 
the sample under consideration failed to comply with 
is principle 2.26, which relates to the disclosure of the 
remuneration of directors and top executives. Their 
reasons for non-disclosure were that, either they 
feared for the safety of individuals whose 
remuneration is disclosed as being top earners or that 
they felt the disclosure was adequate when aggregated 
as the whole remuneration of directors. 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
The South African insurance sector has embraced the 
changes in corporate governance practices brought 
about by the King III code to strengthen their internal 
corporate governance practices. Further a plethora of 
regulatory reforms have been developed to secure the 
insurance sector and the market players are by and 
large conforming to these. However we wish to 
caution the regulators to strike the balance between 
the need for regulation and the “cost of regulation”. 
Over-regulating the sector might end up stifling 
innovation in the sector and the ultimate cost of 
regulation might end up being borne by the insuring 
public in the form of higher premiums. 
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